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This paper reconsiders the debate around the political determination of capital income taxes and explains why such taxes 
survive in most OECD countries. The political economy literature on redistributive politics (Persson and Tabellini 2003) 
emphasizes the role played by the lower class in the political arena: being labor more concentrated than capital, the majority 
of the population benefits by overtaxing capital and undertaxing labour. However, in reality, political participation (voting, 
lobbying, protesting etc.) is positively correlated with income. Therefore, a paradoxical result emerges: why do the upper 
class, who is politically more active and own most of the capital, still favour a positive capital tax? Hence, voters' income is 
not the sole relevant variable in the political determination of the capital tax. To reconcile this apparent puzzle, we propose a 
model that incorporates time inconsistency à la Laibson in individual preferences We show that time inconsistent individuals 
are politically more homogeneous (or “single-minded”) than far-sighted, and prefer to tax more capital income, instead of 
labor income, since accumulated saving are below the planned (and optimal) level and the distortionary effects of a higher 
capital tax are not only reduced but also delayed in time. We demonstrate that, since politicians find easier to please 
hyperbolic voters by proposing a tax policy that includes lower labor and higher capital taxes compared to an economy with 
only far sighted. Moreover, we show that, as the proportion of time inconsistent individuals in the population increases, the 
tax policy becomes more and more biased towards capital taxation. 
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Capital income taxes continue to represent a major source of scal revenues in most OECD countries:
more than 20% of total tax proceeds (OECD, 2007) have reference to various form of capital taxation
(corporate income tax, taxes on capital gains etc.)1.
A common view in the literature (see Auerbach, 2006, for instance) is that the importance of capital
income taxes has decreased over time in most OECD countries: (except for France and Italy2) marginal
tax rate on capital have declined over the period 1973-2004 and have converged towards the same level.
This trend has recently stopped: corporate taxes have actually risen as a share of total revenue over the
last years (especially in the U.S. and Canada), and still account for 10-25% of total tax revenues. As
stressed by Sorensen (2007) and Devereux et al. (2002), the decrease of the corporate income tax rate
has been more than compensated by the enlargement of the tax base3, making the trend in marginal
eective tax rates less evident. If follows that, overall, corporate tax revenues have actually increased in
most OECD countries4. Moreover, if other forms of capital taxation are considered, it is evident that the
scal burden on capital remain signicantly high in the world's leading economies.
Are positive levels of capital taxes justied from an economic standpoint? The normative literature
has not achieved a unanimous consensus upon the optimal level of capital taxation as illustrated by the
following example presented by Martin Feldstein in a post published on marginalrevolution.com.
\Mr. X earns an additional $1,000. If X's marginal tax rate is 35%, he gets to keep $650. X saves
$100 of this and spends the rest. If Mr. X invests these saving, he receives a return of 6% before tax and
3.9% after tax. With ination of 2%, the 3.9% after-tax return is reduced to a real after-tax return of
only 1.9%. If Mr. X is now 40 years old, this 1.9% real rate of return implies that the $100 of saving
will be worth $193 in today's prices when he is 75. So his reward for the extra work is $550 of extra
consumption now and $193 of extra consumption at age 75. But if the tax rate on the income from saving
is reduced to 15%, the 6% interest rate would yield 5.1% after tax and 3.1% after both tax and ination.
And with a 3.1% real return, X's $100 of extra saving would grow to $291 in today's prices instead of
just $193" (Martin Feldstein, www.marginalrevolution.com).
This example illustrates two characteristics of capital taxes.
First, taxes inuence welfare and GDP: they may waste potential output, reduce welfare by decreasing
the reward for saving and distort the allocation between saving and future consumption. Moreover, by
1Capital taxation may take several forms: taxes on interests, dividends, capital gains, business prots, and on the value
of the housing services enjoyed by owners. In this work, we will refer indistinctly as \taxes on capital income".
2The center-left coalition proposed in his electoral program an increase of capital income tax rate from 12.5% to 20%.
So far, however, such reform remains unapproved.
3For instance, governments have eliminated special deductions and generous asset depreciation rules. This strategy (the
tax-cut-cum-base-broadening philosophy, very popular in the 80s and 90s) was encouraged by the practice of prot shifting
and improvement in the ability of avoid taxation by corporations.
4In the U.S., for example, corporate taxes accounted for a higher share of federal revenues in 2005 than in any year since
1979 (Auerbach, 2006, based on OECD data).
2increasing the cost of capital, taxes aect the quantity of investments made by rms, through eects on
the relative returns to risk-taking.
Secondly, if lowering capital taxes would be benecial for both taxpayers and the government, why
does Mr. X, who is supposed to be rational, vote for parties that propose scal platforms distorted towards
capital taxation? In a political economy voting model with oce-seeking candidates, the equilibrium tax
policy platforms that please the majority of voters entails low (possibly zero) taxes on capital income.
Many papers try to justify, from a political point of view, why capital taxes account for a large share of
total tax proceeds. A \redistributive" explanation is generally invoked: being capital more concentrated
than labor, the majority should gain from shifting a larger share of the tax burden to capital. If the
income distribution is skewed to the left, this idea presuppose that poor majority is more powerful
and better organized than rich in the political process, and are able to impose their preferences to the
losing minority. However, we know from the political science literature that rich individuals are more
active in the voting process than poor5, and that are less interested in redistribution. Therefore, the
\redistributive " explanation is not robust to the reality and the question: \Why does capital income
taxation still survive?" remains unanswered.
This paper justies this apparent puzzle by considering a model that mixes economic, political and
behavioral considerations. We propose a multidimensional voting model with opportunistic parties and
voters that dier along two dimensions: productivity level and time inconsistency. Introducing a second
source of heterogeneity allows us to depart from the idea that agents/voters display perfect rationality.
This assumption places our paper into the Economics and Psychology literature (see Laibson, 1997 for
a review) that emphasizes how individuals' behavior can be better described by a model with bounded
rationality. In particular, we assume that individuals, especially whenever it exists a temporal gap
between the costs and the benets associated with a given action, may be more impatient in the short
run than in the long run, thus displaying time inconsistency.
Formally, to capture this idea, each individual is modeled as a collection of selves: hyperbolic discount-
ing leads present selves to overweight current payos compared to future ones, giving rise to a conict
between preferences of dierent intertemporal selves. Moreover, not only a time inconsistent individual
makes plans that, in absence of any suitable commitment devices, will he will systematically change, but
also regrets, ex-post, of his lack of commitment.






5Rich contribute more in political campaigns, have a higher turnout and have more resources to devote to lobbying
activities.
3where  represents the short-term psychological discount factor, and  is the long term one. This
formulation implies that the discount function is 1 at t = 0 and to t for t = 1;2;:::;T. It follows
that implied discount factor between today and the next period is , whereas that between any two
subsequent periods in the future is : the discount factor is rst declining, and constant thereafter6.
Together with our behavioral assumption, the model takes into account several aspects of the real
life politics: in particular, we consider that political participation is increasing with income and some
individuals are excluded from the political game. By taking into account real turnouts in political
elections, we show that it is hard to justify the idea of poor being able to impose their preferred capital
taxes to the rich minority.
Anticipating the results, we show that, when voting over the optimal tax mix that nances a re-
distributive transfer, poor and time inconsistent agents, for any income level, are \single minded", and
both agree to lower labor income tax and to increase capital taxation. The intuition for the result is the
following: the lower class, owning less capital, favors naturally high capital taxes. However, since this
group participates less in the political process, needs to form a coalition with time inconsistent voters,
who share, for any income level, the same preferences on the optimal allocation of the tax burden between
capital and income taxation. Hyperbolic individuals prefer higher capital taxes for two reasons: rst,
increasing the after-tax return from savings has only a negligible eect on hyperbolic propensity to save:
because of their preferences, they still prefer to consume \too much " when young instead of saving,
despite the higher return. Second, labor supply is chosen period-by-period, and thus is unaected by
time inconsistency; increasing labor taxes today (together with a lower capital tax tomorrow) implies a
rst-order reduction in hyperbolic current utility and only a second-order increase in their future utility.
Given individual preferences, opportunistic parties maximize the probability of being elected by propos-
ing a scal burden distorted towards capital taxation, as to exploit the single mindedness of hyperbolic
and poor voters.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we present stylized facts about capital taxation, as to
show that they account for a substantial part of tax revenues in most OECD countries. In section 3 we
review the economic literature on capital taxation, both from a normative and a positive point of view.
Section 4 presents stylized facts about political participation. Section 5 presents our basic model, which
is solved for individuals (section 6) and for the two parties (section 7). Section 8 concludes.
6The empirical relevance of this behavioral assumption has been tested (Ainsle 1992) through experiments, simulations
and real data. In particular, Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998 and 2004), using data on credit card borrowing and
consumption-income comovement, test whether individuals actually behave patiently in the long term and impatiently in
the short term. They nd hat the hypothesis that the short term discount factor  coincides with the long run one, ,
should be reject. Moreover, the estimated values for the  and  are, respectively, around 40% and 4%, thus conrming
that the hyperbolic model better explains individuals' decision making.
4Figure 1: Corporate Tax Rates (Source: Sorensen, 2007)
2 Stylized Facts about Capital Taxation
According to Carey and Rabesona (2004), the average level of capital income taxation was around 50%
of income in 2002. Data in Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that, in a sample of 14 OECD countries,
the average eective tax rates on capital and labor were about the same (around 38%) over the period
1991-1995. In the same period, in U.S. and U.K. capital taxes were higher than labor taxes.
Capital taxes concern both corporations and individuals. For the former, taxes on corporate income
(the most important form of capital tax) have fallen in the period 1980-2004 (Figure 1), but the proceeds
of this tax have substantially increased, except in Japan, Germany and UK (Figure 2). Since prot shares
in the GDP have remained almost the same (Sorensen 2007), this increase in revenues was mainly due
to the enlargement of the tax base. Therefore, eective corporate taxation has increased.
It is hard to present evidence for personal capital taxes: the diculty comes from the fact that OECD
statistics do not decompose total revenue from personal income taxes into tax falling on capital income
and tax levied on labour income.
Sorensen (2007) estimates the tax structure and the allocation among dierent sources (capital, labor
and property): from gure 3, we see that personal taxes on capital income contribute between 5 and 10
percent of total tax revenue in OECD most countries. On the other hand, the table shows that corporate
taxation is a more signicant revenue raiser than the personal capital income tax. The importance of
property taxes, a mix that includes taxes on the ownership and transfer of real and nancial assets, varies
quite a lot across countries.
The rest of the section focuses on the structure of capital taxation in the United States, where more
data are available, and the puzzle between capital taxes and voting behavior is more evident. In the U.S.
5Figure 2: Corporate Tax Revenues (Source: Sorensen, 2007)
individuals and corporations pay capital income tax on the net total of all their capital proceeds just as
they do on other sorts of income.
Back to 1963, the highest marginal rate of personal (capital and labor) income tax was 93 percent.
This rate was reduced, but even as recently as 1980, the top income tax rate was 70 percent and interest
and dividend, and the corporate tax rate was around 46 per cent. Moreover, capital gains tax rates
were signicantly increased in the 1969 and 1976 Tax Reform Acts: the minimum tax rate for such
gains was increased up to 15 percent, whereas the maximum rate reached 40 percent (Auten 1999). In
1978, Congress reduced capital gains tax rates by eliminating the minimum tax on excluded gains and
increasing the exclusion to 60 percent, thereby reducing the maximum rate to 28 percent. The 1981 tax
rate reductions further reduced capital gains rates to a maximum of 20 percent. The Tax Reform Act
signed by president Reagan in 1986 changed substantially the tax code: corporate tax rate was reduced
to 35 percent (although, as we have seen the tax base was broaden), but the exclusion of long-term gains
was repealed, and the maximum tax rate for short term capital gains was raised to 28 percent (33 percent
for taxpayers subject to phaseouts). As an example, Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of nominal and
eective tax rates for capital gains for the period 1984-1995: eective tax rates increased during this
period.
Until 2003, no substiantial reforms in the tax treatment of capital gains were adopted. In 2003, the
tax rate for individuals was lowered for long-term capital gains, i.e. gains on assets held for over one year
before being sold, and increased for short-term capital gains. For the former, the tax rate was reduced to
15% (or to 5% for individuals in the lowest income tax brackets). On the other hand, the latter are taxed
at the (higher) ordinary income tax rate. This reduced tax rate was scheduled to expire in 2008 but the
6Figure 3: Tax Structures in OECD countries in 2004 (percent of total tax revenues; Source: Sorensen,
2007)
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, signed by President Bush in 2006, has extended this
reduced tax rate through 2010. After that date, taxes will revert to the rates in eect before 2003, which
were generally 25%7. Concerning corporate taxes, the eective average tax rate in the U.S. is around
40%.
This section has presented stylized facts about capital taxation: data for most OECD countries show
that eective capital taxes, and in particular corporate taxes, remain high. The same appears to be true
for the taxation of long term capital gains, since recently implemented tax cuts are temporary and have
a clear electoral motive.
The following sections will verify whether the literature on optimal capital income taxation is in line
with these empirical observations.
3 Literature Review on Capital Taxation
3.1 Normative Theories
What is the optimal level of the capital income tax? Is replacing capital taxes with other forms of
taxation welfare-increasing? Normative public economic literature has tried to answer these questions,
but so far unanimity among economists has not been reached. In this section we try to summarize the
main ndings about this topic8.
7Given that the empirical evidence show that voters of the Republican party are in average richer than Democrats
(Krugman 2007, Bartels 2007), this reform could appear, at rst sight, harmful for Republican voters.
8The background for this section is given by Auerbach and Hines (1998), Barnheim (1999) and Sorensen (2007).
7Figure 4: Capital Taxation in the U.S. (1984-1995)
There is a presumption among economists that capital taxes raise revenues in a less ecient way than
wage or consumption taxes. Many authors show9 that capital taxes are desirable only in the short-run:
after some initial transition in which savings are discouraged, the long-run capital tax has to converge
to zero. The intuition behind this result is related to the classical Ramsey (1927) model; by interpreting
consumption at dierent dates as dierent commodities, and the capital tax as a selective commodity
tax on future consumption, the uniform taxation result applies: capital income should be taxed in the
initial period, where the relative price distortion caused by capital income taxation is nite, but never in
the following periods, since the size of the distortion increases. This result continues to hold if we assume
that individuals have to make a labor supply decision, provided that their utility function is separable
between labor and consumption (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976)10.
The Chamley-Judd result, however, relies on simplifying assumptions: preferences should be in-
tertemporally separable and isoelastic; capital markets have to be perfectly competitive and complete
(individuals may freely reallocate consumption over time by borrowing and lending); there is no uncer-
tainty over the labor income; the time horizon of the representative individual coincides with the one of
the planner11. Removing these assumptions, positive12 capital taxes may become optimal. If borrowing
9See, for instance, Diamond (1973), Auerbach (1978), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Judd (1985 and 1999), Chamley
(1986), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994).
10The Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem is a particular case of the Corlett-Hague (1953) rule: a commodity tax system that
minimize the deadweight loss should impose higher taxes on commondities that are more complementary to leisure, since
this will minimize the tax induced subsitution towards leisure. Therefore, if future consumption is more complementary
to leisure than present consumption, the former should be reduced through a tax on savings. Since ther is no evidence
whether future consumption is more or less substitutable for leisure than present consumption, most economist assume the
same degree of substitutability, and therefore a zero optimal capital income tax.
11In a recent paper, Abel (2007) challenges the Chamley-Judd result without a substantial depart from the basic model: in
an economy with identical innitely-lived households, if the purchasers of capital are allowed to deduct capital expenditures
from the capital income tax base, then a constant and positive tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. The tax
system that implements the optimal allocation consists of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor
income, the opposite result found by Chamley and Judd.
12Or negative taxes (subsidies). See Judd (1997).
8constraints, and/or imperfections in the labor and credit markets exist, than it may be optimal to levy a
capital tax even if the horizon is innite (Aiyagari, 1993 and Chamley, 2001). If labor income is subject
to stochastic shocks, in absence of market-provided insurances, a capital tax plays the role of a publicly
provided insurance device against productivity shocks, and its proceeds may be used to make transfers
from high consumption to low consumption states, in order to insure individuals against low-consumption
states,Along this line of research, the New Dynamic Public Finance literature (see Kocherlakota 2006, for
a review) has recently reconsidered the determination of the optimal tax burden in a dynamic framework,
with credit markets imperfections and random shocks on individuals' productivity. The main result that
emerges is that the optimal wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal rate of transfor-
mation is dierent from zero, i.e. saving should be discouraged. The optimal intertemporal allocation
can be implemented using a tax system that is linear in current wealth, but equal to zero in expected
and aggregate terms.
In settings where consumers' time horizon is shorter than the planner's one (as in OLG models  a
la Diamond), or when future consumption is more complementary to leisure than present consumption
(Erosa and Gervais, 2002), a positive capital tax may be optimal.
Redistributive concerns also provide a rational for positive capital taxes: Krusell et al. (2000) and
Salani e (2003), by extending the Atkinson-Stiglitz model to a dynamic framework, show that a positive
capital income tax is indeed optimal. To be more precise, they assume that saving for future consumption
induce capital accumulation and inuence pre-tax factor incomes. If skilled labor is more complementary
to capital than unskilled labor, it follows that the proceeds of a capital tax that discourages saving can
be used to redistribute income in favour of low-income earners, given that the distortion induced by this
tax is more than compensated by the welfare gain of a more equitable distribution of income 13. Finally,
a linear tax on capital income represent an optimal instrument to nance a redistributive transfer when
the tax authority is not able to observe and to tax directly inherited individual wealth (Cremer et al.,
2003, and Boadway et al. 2000).
Even if taxing capital would be optimal, it is also possible that such form of taxation originates
substantial welfare losses that can removed by replacing them with labor or consumption taxes. In this
sense, Feldstein (1978) shows that replacing capital with labor taxes yielding the same revenues increases
welfare by approximately 18%. This conclusion continue to hold in a general equilibrium framework:
Chamley (1981) and Judd (1987), in models with innite-lived individuals, show that the deadweight
loss of taxing capital is high (around 11% of total revenue, when the capital tax rate is 30%. Welfare
losses are substantial also if in a OLG framework: simulations in Diamond (1970) and Summers (1981)
show that steady state welfare would increase by 12% if capital taxation were replaced with consumption
13If this complementarity is not taken into account, capital accumulation does not aect the pre-tax distribution of wages,
and thus a zero capital income tax is still optimal, provided that utility is separable in consumption and leisure (Ordover
and Phelps, 1979)
9taxes, and by 5% if were replaced by a labor income tax14. Auerbach, Kotliko and Skinner (1983)
improve upon Summers' analysis, comparing not only steady states welfare levels, but also changes in
welfare along the transition path, and conrm that replacing capital with consumption taxes would
increase steady state welfare by 6%. However, if the capital income tax is replaced by a wage tax, steady
state welfare would decline by 4%.
This section shows that, from an eciency standpoint, capital taxation is in general not desirable,
provided that some simplifying assumption are satised. However, once redistributive concerns are taken
into account, the optimal capital tax may be positive. Simulations show that a reform replacing the
capital income tax with other forms of taxation (on wages or consumption) would be welfare-improving.
3.2 Positive Theories
This section reviews the political economy literature on capital taxation; the objective is to understand
how the level of capital taxation is determined in the political arena. Several papers have tried to justify
the existence of positive capital taxes: we classify these explanations into four groups.
First, capital taxes may exist because for a government it represents an ecient way to collect revenues.
Politicians may refrain from eliminating capital taxation if increasing the after tax return of saving does
not boost capital accumulation, but only decreases total revenues. The relevance of this explanation
depends on the sign and the magnitude of the interest elasticity of saving, that measure the responsiveness
of saving accumulation to a change in their after-tax return. From a theoretical standpoint, this elasticity
can be either positive or negative (Bernheim, 1999), and saving can rise or fall in response to a decrease of
the tax rate. If individual preferences are represented by a CES utility function, the sign of this elasticity
depend on the sign of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption: saving rises (resp. falls)
in response to cut in the tax rate if the elasticity of substitution is high (resp. small). Unfortunately, the
empirical literature15 is not able to provide a direct estimate for the value of this elasticity. To overcome
these diculties, a dierent (indirect) approach has been adopted: in particular, scholars have tried
to compute how the introduction of tax-deferred savings account16 (IRA and 401(k), for instance) has
modied the choice of optimal saving. The question is to understand how much less would contributors
have saved in absence of these accounts. Unfortunately, the answer is still undetermined: IRAs were
eective in attracting new contribution, but it is not clear whether these savings are \new" or simple
displacements from other forms of savings (Bernheim, 1999). It is clear that the mixed evidence about
14Summers' analisys suers from several drawbacks: rst, he considers only the steady state and not the transition path
following the tax reform, and thus he negliges the negative distributional eects that reduce transitional generations' welfare.
Second, labor supply is inelastic, and thus the optimal tax rate is zero by assumption.
15See Bernheim (1999), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996).
16IRAs and 401(k) were introduced by the U.S. goverment in the 70s, to boost individual saving: these accounts feature
tax deductible contributions up to a certain limit, tax-free accumulation, taxation of principal and interest on withdrawal,
and penalties for early withdrawal. After an initial popularity (20 billions $ in the 1986), contributions fell to less than 10
billions $).
10the sign of elasticity of substitution does not allow us to conclude whether a lower tax rate on capital
increase/decrease/keep constant savings and therefore we can not infer that individuals and politicians
prefer to tax capital as to minimize distortions17.
A second political justication for capital taxation is related to the lack of credibility of politicians, or
the capital levy problem (Fischer, 1980): announcing a reduction in capital taxes would not be credible
for the politician, since the elasticity of saving already accumulated is zero. In equilibrium, capital will
be highly taxed, more than would be ecient for the representative agent. Such a strategy, however,
does not work in a repeated model, where politicians care not only about winning the current election,
but also maintaining their reputation: announcing low capital taxes before elections and taxing capital
later will destroy politicians' credibility for the future.
A third explanation refers to the strategic political delegation: rational voters, anticipating that, after
the elections, the policy-maker will face a dierent set of incentive constraints, prefer to elect someone
with dierent preferences from their own. Agents overcome the capital levy problem by using another
government at their advantage. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, since it is know that most
of voters have an ideological bias towards a political party, and quite rarely are willing to modify their
vote to tie the government's hands.
The forth political explanation for positive levels of capital taxation relies on redistributive concerns,
which may also justify capital taxes from a normative standpoint. This view is proposed by Persson and
Tabellini (2003): when voting over the composition of the tax burden, the lower class has more political
power than the upper class, given that labour income is less concentrated than capital income, and poor
represent generally the majority of the population. Therefore, the winning majority is composed by poor
individuals that benet from more redistribution, and the policy vector entails overtaxation of capital
income and undertaxation of labour income. However, this model has little empirical support: in real
life elections rich are indeed the more involved in the political process and, ex-ante, are not interested in
redistribution. Moreover, since they own more capital, the resulting positive level of capital taxation is
puzzling.
None of the political theories reviewed is fully able to explain, in our opinion, the level of capital
taxes observed in reality; our paper, by considering dierent assumptions about individuals' rationality
and some facts about how elections work, will help to understand this puzzle.
17Feldstein (2006 and 2007) shows that, even if the interest elasticity of substitution were eectively zero, the negative
eects of capital taxation on saving would remain: a tax not only aects current consumption, but also future consumption
that could be actually bought by saving. Feldstein provides the following example: assume that in absence of capital taxes,
the return of savings is 10%. If the capital tax is 50%, the net return is only 5%. For an individual who saves at 45 years
old and dissaves at 75, each dollar saved increased future consumption to 17$ whereas, with the tax, one dollar today will
buy only 4,3$, with a decline of 75%, for a given level of saving.
114 The Political Science Literature
The political economy literature has not yet considered three important stylized facts known by political
science scholars. Incorporating real world facts into economics would help us to better understand how
politicians take decisions and why certain policies are implemented.
First, not all individuals are politically active18: turnouts (dened as percent of the voting popu-
lation, i.e. everyone above the minimal age for voting, usually 18 years), are much lower than 100%:
the average is around 77% in European countries, around 50% in the United States and 54% on aver-
age in Latin America countries. While turnout across the globe rose steadily between 1945 and 1980
(increasing from 61% in the 1940s to 68% in the 1980s), since then it has dipped back to 64%, despite
the increase in educational levels and economic well-being19 (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,
2007). Several reasons justify this tendency20: rst, burdensome registration procedures may represent a
major institutional deterrent to voting. This happens in the U.S. (Rosenstone 1993), but less for Europe,
where voting procedures are less complicated. However, also Europe has experienced dramatic declines
in voter turnouts (Topf, 1995). Second, also the salience of the issues plays a role in determining voters'
participation: political elections have higher turnouts than administrative and local elections, perceived
to be less important. Third, turnout is inuenced by the attractiveness of parties and candidates: many
countries have recently experienced a growing disbelief towards politics and a lower interest for political
activity. Fourth, institutional design aects turnout: the choice of the electoral system aects on voters'
participation according (Lijphart, 1994): Proportional Representation increases voting participation, by
giving citizens more choices and by eliminating wasted votes (votes cast for losing candidates or for can-
didates that win with big majorities), which is typical of systems that use Single-Member districts. The
frequency of elections also negatively inuenced turnout (Boyd, 1989) by increasing the cost of voting.
Whichever the reasons for low turnouts are, this fact would not represent a issue if non-participation
was randomly and evenly distributed among social classes: however, participations is highly unequal, and
it is systematically biased in favor of those with higher incomes, greater wealth and better education,
against less advantaged citizens (Lijphart 1997). This leads us to the second stylized fact: political
participation increases with income21. A common idea is that self-interest is the main motivation for
18In our terminology, the \political process" includes not only voting, but also broader form of political participation, both
conventional (working in election campaigns, contribution ot parties or candidates, working informally in the community,
lobbying) and unconventional (participation in demonstrastions, boycotts, rents and tax strikes, occupations).
19Countries with low literacy rates do not necessarily have a lower turnout: there is no signicant statistical correlation
between education level and voter turnout, although highly literate countries, on average, have a higher level of political
participation. Nevertheless, high illiteracy countries such as Angola and Ethiopia have achieved high turnout rates.
20Following the \voting paradox " theory,the striking result that has to be explained is not why 50% of citizens do not
vote, but why there is still a 50% of them who continues to do it, since their vote is far from being decisive and not voting is
seen as a completely rational activity. However, we take as given the fact the voter's turnout is low, and we do not anayze
the determinants of voting.
21At the beninning of 20th century, with the adoption of universal surage in many countries, political analysts were
convinced that the intellectual  elite would have preferred not to vote, since its vote would drown among the votes of the
12voting: those who have a higher stake in the political process should be the more active. It follows that
poor individuals, who in principle benet more from public policies and redistributive transfers, should be
more involved in the political process. However, there is an old and vast empirical evidence that does not
conrm this myth22: Gosnell (1927) nds that turnout increases with economic status and that \the more
schooling the individual has the more likely he is to register and vote in elections". The same pattern
is reported also in Arneson (1925) and Tingsten (1937), who reviewed elections' results in Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Austria, U.S. and Sweden and formulated the rule that \voting frequency rises
with rising social standard". This bias is particularly strong in the U.S., where \no matter which form
citizen participation takes, the pattern of class equality is unbroken (Lijpart 1997)", and where, over
time, the level of voting participation and class inequality are strongly and negatively linked. A study
by Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2007), shows that, for OECD countries, those who voted in
the current election have a higher average income than those who did not. An exception to this trend is
the participation of senior citizens specically with regard to Social Security (Campbell, 2002): in this
case, participation decreases as income rises, in part because lower-income citizens are more dependent
on the program.
The positive correlation between income and participation leads us to the third fact: politicians tend
to favor the opinion of rich. Given that the upper class participates more actively in the political debate,
it is not surprising that \inequalities in political participation are likely to be associated with inequalities
in governmental responsiveness " (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995),
Bartels (2005) provides some evidence that support this intuition. His paper investigates how respon-
sive U.S. senators are to the preferences of rich, middle-class, and poor constituents; senators appear
to be considerably more responsive to the opinions of auent constituents than to the opinions of the
middle-class, while the opinions of poor have no apparent statistical eect on their senators' roll call
votes. The sign of the bias is the same both for Democrats and Republican senators; however, the latter
appear to be more than twice as responsive as the former to the ideological views of rich constituents.
Forth, there is a dierence in voter turnout between young and old voters: old's participation rates
are higher than young individuals with the same characteristics (income, wealth level, education etc.).
For instance, data from the U.S. National Election Study show that citizens aged more than 6 were 7%
more likely to vote than their young counterpart.
Another fact, although less clear and more controversial in the political literature, is the relationship
between income level and the ideological view of the voter: a persistent myth is that rich people vote
Democratic, while workers vote Republican23. However, according to data in Krugman (2007) and Bartels
mass. Quite soon, empirical studies showed that status and voting were positively, and not negatively, correlated.
22\ [...] Low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout. This pattern is so clear, strong and well
known in the U.S. that it does not need to be elabored further". (Lijphart, 1997)
23According to MSNBC's political journalist Tucker Carlson: \Here's the fact that nobody ever, ever mentions |
13(2006), the truth is just the opposite24. According to 2006 exit polls, among individuals with less than
$100,000 (78% of the voting population), 55% voted for Democratic Party, and 43% for Republicans. For,
individuals with more than $100,000, 47% voted Democrats and 52% Republicans. A 4-point dierence
between top and bottom became a 14-point dierence.
This analysis shows that poor are more or less excluded from the political arena. They have lower
turnouts and are less involved in other political activities (lobbying, campaign nancing etc.). It is
not surprising that oce-seeking parties try to please the more involved in the political life, as Bartels
(2006) has stressed. But this is in contrast with the evidence presented in previous sections: if the
active electorate is composed mostly by wealthy individuals who own most of the capital in the economy,
and political parties are sensitive to rich's preferences, then why is tax burden distorted towards capital
taxation? Interestingly, capital taxes appear to be higher than labor taxes in the U.S. than in Europe,
although the positive relationship between income and participation is stronger in the U.S. Does it mean
that U.S. citizens vote against their interests? Is there really a Myth of the Rational Voter (Caplan,
2007) and individuals approve bad policies just because they are misinformed by politicians and unable
to fully understand the economic implications of political actions?
We believe that voters are rational, but their behavior can be better described with a model with
bounded rationality and, in particular, by quasi hyperbolic discounting. The puzzling result about capital
taxation can be perfectly understood through a political economy model that embeds more realistic
assumptions about individuals preferences: some individuals display a higher preference for present utility,
whereas others do not, and these preferences not only matter for economic choices but also for political
decisions.
5 The Economic Environment
We consider a three-periods OLG model; in every period, three generations are alive: old, middle aged
andyoung. Population grows at a constant rate G. The size of each generation is denoted, respectively,
with and no, nma = (1 + G)no and ny = (1 + G)
2 no.
When young and middle aged, individuals supply labor l and save for post retirement consumption,
s: the endowment of units of time is normalized to one. When old, an individual is retired and con-
sumes saving accumulated in previous periods and receive a transfer P, that represent an instrument
of intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution, which is nanced through the proceeds of two
Democrats win rich people. Over 100,000 in income, you are likely more than not to vote for Democrats. People never
point that out. Rich people vote liberal. I don't know what that's all about".
24In a post published in his own weblog, economist Paul Krugman states: \There's a weird myth among the commentary
that rich people vote Democratic. There's another strange thing about that myth: the notion that income class doesn't
matter for voting, or that it's perverse, has spread even as the actual relationship between income and voting has become
much stronger. And the fact that people with higher incomes are more likely to vote Republican has been consistently true
since 1972. The interesting question is why so many pundits know for a fact something that simply ain't so".
14proportional taxes25: on labor26, !, and capital income, K:
Utility of consumption is expressed by the increasing and concave utility function u(:), while the
disutility of eort is expressed by v(:), with v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) > 0. Let r be the constant and exogenous
gross return on wealth.
Within each generation, individuals dier with respect to two dimensions27: productivity level and
the degree of time inconsistency.
For the former, we assume that each individual, at the beginning of his life, is assigned with a
productivity !, which remains the same in the next period: ! can take two values, !P (poor) and !R
(rich), with the obvious ranking !R > !P. Each income group represents, respectively, a fraction P
and R (or, alternatively, 1   P) of each group, with P > R. The mean wage of the economy is
 ! = R!R + P!P:
For the latter, we assume that certain individuals display a bias toward the present in intertemporal
trade-os and ex-post regret about their lack of commitment. More precisely, the psychological short-term
discount factor  between two subsequent periods is lower for time inconsistent than for time consistent
individuals: TI < TC. Furthermore, we assume that time inconsistent individuals are sophisticated,
in the sense that they are aware of their self-control issues but, in absence of any commitment device28,
they are not able to stick to their optimal plans. On the other hand, time consistent (or exponential)
individuals can implement optimal consumption paths. Time consistent and time inconsistent individuals
represents, respectively, a fraction TC and TI of each income group29. Therefore, in each generation,
we have four group of individuals: poor time consistent (a fraction PTC of the population), rich time
consistent (RTC), poor time inconsistent
 
PTI




The behavioral assumption aects the consumption/saving choice; anticipating the results, we show
that time inconsistent old experience a drop in post-retirement consumption, caused by overconsumption
when young and middle aged. On the other hand, labor supply, being decided period by period, is not
inuenced by hyperbolic discounting.
Taking into account the two sources of heterogeneity and the three generations, twelve groups coexist
25P can represent either a pension transfer awarded only to retirees, or a public good that increase only old's consumption:
health care, for instance, whose consumption increase with age.
26If P is interpreted as a pension benet, then ! is the payroll tax that nances the PAYG system.
27We assume that the two sources of heterogeneity are uncorrelated. The existence of a positive (or negative) correlation
between income level and degree of time inconsistency is an open empirical question.
28Assuming, as we implicitly do, that markets are incomplete, i.e. commitment devices for hyperbolic are not available,
may appear too strong. However, assuming the completeness of nancial markets implies also that we should consider that,
together with commitment devices, the market would propose \counter-commitment devices" that exploit the consumers'
present bias. For instance in the U.S., the growth of IRA accounts, 401(k) plans has been followed by the boom of revolving
credit cards. Moreover, as we show in the introduction, there is no sure evidence that the introduction of IRA accounts
and 401(k) plans has eectively boosted individual savings.
29Clearly, R + P = 1 and TC+ TI = 1. Moreover, we assume that the fractions of rich, poor, time consistent and
time inconsistent individuals remain the same across periods. Finally, we do not impose any ranking between TC and
TI:














Figure 5: Behavioral and Economic Types






o = (1 + r(1   K)si;j
ma) + P
and si;j
















is the total labor supplied by young and middle aged belonging to the same

















total amount of saving for time inconsistent and exponential individuals.
The preferences of a middle aged depend on consumption, ci:j





















o = (1 + r(1   K)si;j
ma) + P





















16where the budget constraints are:
ci;j
y = !ili








o = (1 + r(1   K))si;j
ma + P
Utility functions (4) and (5) reect the general intertemporal hyperbolic utility function given by (1): the
discount structure implies that individuals, when young, discount the utility level of subsequent periods
at the rate  (middle aged) and 2 (old) meaning that they are impatient when they make short run
trade-os. On the other hand, from the point of of view of a young individual, the discount factor between
two periods far in the future (between middle age and old age) is simply , implying that the agent is
patient in the long run. To simplify our computations and to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume








The utility function belongs to the family of constant utility of substitution, where the elasticity of
substitution is given by " = 1
, with 0 <   130. The parameter  measures the intensity of the
disutility of eort.
Let us now move to the political side of our economy. The public policy vector is dened as q =
(K;!): the two parties propose a platform that includes a capital income and a labor income tax. The
policy vector is multidimensional, and generally in such a framework an equilibrium may not exists: we
adopt a model with probabilistic voting, in the spirit of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Coughlin and
Nitzan (1981), which is particularly appropriate in our case since allows us to consider the ideological
bias of the dierent social classes.
We assume that there are two parties, A and B; before the election takes place, parties choose,
simultaneously and not cooperatively, the platform q that maximizes his expected number of vot-
ers. Politicians can commit to the policies promised during the campaign. We assume that voters
are not only interested in the proposed policies, but also in the ideological elements that each party













TC vote for party A if:
V x(qA) +   + k;x > V x(qB)
where V x(qA) is the indirect utility function of voters in group x if policy qA is implemented and the
term (  + k;x) reects voter's k ideological bias towards A. The component   is common to all voters
30In particular, for  = 1, we have the logarithmic utility function (" = 1), while 0 <  < 1 yields " > 1 (substitutes) and
 < 1 yields " < 0 (complements).






with mean zero and density d. The ideology of voter k in group







, with zero mean and density x.
The timing of the elections is as follows: (1) The two parties announce their policy platforms; at this
stage, economic decisions are already made: therefore, parties knows voters' policy preferences and the
distribution of the random variables   and k;x, but not their realizations. (2) The value of d is realized
and know. (3) Election takes place and the winning party implements his preferred policy.
Each group of individuals has neutral voters (also called swing voters) who are indierent between A
and B. The identity of the swing voters is crucial when a politician consider deviations form the common
policy announcement qA = qB. To better understand this concept, consider only two groups, capitalist
(who hold only capital) and workers (who have only labor). Suppose that party A decides to decrease
K with a corresponding increase in ! such that the transfer P remains the same. Doing that, the party
gains votes from the capitalist equal to the number of swing voters and lose votes from the group of
workers equal to the number of swing voters. If the number of swing voters in the rst group is greater
than the number of swing voters in the second group, the party will have a net gain of votes. Therefore,
each party is interested in attracting the more mobile voters in each group. A swing voter in group x is
dened by sv where:
sv = V x(qB)   V x(qA)    
All voters with k;x > sv vote for A and voters with k;x < sv vote for B. Therefore, the share of
voters in group x that votes for party A is:
A;x = x  












V x(qA)   V x(qB)

(8)
where vx represents the number of voters in each group x listed above. The central point of our paper
is that the number of people who actually show up the election day is lower from the number of person
alive in each generation. If the number of swing voters in every group x is the same, the problem (8)
reduces to a simple maximization of average utilities. However, in our framework, groups dier in how
votes can be swayed from one party to the other one. Therefore, parties try to please the more mobile
voters by giving them more weight in the objective function.
186 Individuals' Problem
6.1 First Step: Labor Supply and Saving
Young Let us consider the problem for a young of income !i, for i = R;P. He chooses labor supply
and saving for post-retirement consumption as to maximize the following intertemporal utility function,
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o = (1 + r(1   K)si;j
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Optimal choices for thus given, respectively, by:
l














= s(j;!i;!;K) is a function (whose closed form expression is
given in the appendix) that describes optimal saving accumulation as a function of the parameters. The
following proposition summarizes its the properties.





has the following properties, for i = P;R and j = TI;TC:
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The rst three results of the Proposition are intuitive: part (i) shows that, for a given level of time
inconsistency, rich save more than poor: sP;j
y < sR;j
y : this is consistent with the evidence that a minority
of rich holds the majority of capital of the economy.
In (ii), we state that saving are a decreasing function of the labor income tax, !. This reduction is
negatively correlated with productivity: for a given level of time inconsistency, if the labor income tax
rate rises, poor reduce their savings more than rich.
Result (iii) is in line with the theoretical literature on taxation and saving (Bernheim, 1999). More
precisely, depending on whether the uncompensated interest elasticity of saving is positive or negative,
saving can either decrease or increase in response to a reduction of the capital tax rate, i.e. an increase in
the after-tax rate of return of saving. From one hand, a reduction of K reduces the price of consumption
in periods 1 and 2: the associated substitution eect shifts consumption towards the future (i.e. saving
increase), if future consumption is a normal good (as we assume). From the other hand, the income eect
increases consumption in both periods (i.e. saving decrease). Unless we specify further the parameters
of our model, we are not able to determine which eect prevails in our model. In the rest of the paper,
we consider separately the two cases.
Furthermore, we show that rich and poor respond dierently after an increase of K (part iv): if
the income eect prevails (saving increases), rich individuals will increase saving more than a poor
individual with the same j. On the other hand, if the substitution eect prevails (saving decreases),
then the derivative is positive: rich individuals decreases less their saving than poor.
In part (v), we demonstrate that, for a given !i, time inconsistency leads to overconsumption: si;TC
y >
si;TI
y , for i = P;R. This is a classical results in the behavioral literature, which has stressed (Laibson,
1997 and Laibson et al. 1998) that individuals regret about their saving rates and that retirees experience
a drop in their post retirement consumption levels (Bernheim, 1998). Moreover, combining this result
with part (i), it is possible to show that, if there is enough inequality in the economy, i.e. !R >> !P, we
have that sP;TC
y < sR;TI
y . Despite their time inconsistency, hyperbolic rich individuals continue to save
20more than poor and time consistent agents.
Part (vi) focuses on the eects of time inconsistency on saving accumulation; we rst show that,
keeping constant !i, the decrease of saving due to a higher ! is more intense for hyperbolic consumer;
the result is intuitive but meaningful: increasing ! reduces individuals' disposable income and saving
(see part (iii)); time inconsistent individuals, who are more likely to sacrice future consumption in
favor of present consumption, reduce more saving that exponential individuals. The second part of (vi)
shows an interesting result: when K changes, exponential are more responsive than time inconsistent
in adapting their saving. More precisely, when the income (resp. substitution) eect prevails and saving
increase (resp. decrease), exponential increase saving more (resp. less) than hyperbolic. The intuition for
the result is the following: for hyperbolic young, the eects of a change in the tax are not only postponed
in the future but also reduced, given that the weight attached to future utility is lower, and therefore
they are less responsive in adapting their saving to the changes in the tax code.
Following Laibson (1997), it is possible to prove the following Corollary, which shows that time
inconsistent agents would benet from an increase of saving from si;TI
y up to si;TC
y : if a commitment
device that forces them to save up to this level would be made available, total welfare would increase.
However, our assumption about the absence of such devices makes this Pareto improvement impossible.
Corollary 1 Increasing saving from si;TC
y to si;TI
y is welfare-improving for time inconsistent individuals
(young and middle aged)
Proof. In appendix.
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ma(!i) = (!i(1   !))
 (12)
From equations (11) and (12), it is easy to see that labor supply does not depend on j, while the con-
sumption saving trade-o is inuenced by hyperbolic discounting. Comparative statics over the function
s(:) yields to the following proposition:





has the following properties, for i = P;R and j = TI;TC:
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Corollary 2 Increasing saving from si;TC
ma to si;TI
ma is welfare-improving for time inconsistent individuals
(young and middle aged)
Proof. In appendix.
Intuitions behind Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 are similar to those of Proposition 1 and Corollary
1. The only exception is given by (iv): it is possible that hyperbolic middle aged save more than a
far-sighted. Depending on the value of j, two opposite eects determine the sign of this derivative: from
one hand, the bias toward the present leads to overconsumption today (the hyperbolic eect). On the
other hand, since we assume that hyperbolic are aware of their self-control issues, it is possible that, to
nance consumption when old, they decide to save more, compared to an exponential individual (catching
up eect The conditions determining which eect dominates are given in the appendix.
Old The problem for old individual is simple: they do not make any economic choice and only consume
their accumulated saving and the transfer Peq(!;K).
22Figure 6: The Pension Function
The Transfer P Once optimal savings and the labor supply for young and middle aged are known, we
compute the equilibrium pension transfer Peq(!;K) received by old (see the Appendix for the closed
form expression for Peq(!;K)) 31 and its properties.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium transfer Peq(!;K) is:
(i) Increasing in the level of the labor income tax up to ~ ! and then decreasing;
(iia) If the substitution eect prevails, the pension function is increasing with the level of the capital
income tax up to ~ K and then decreasing;
(iib) If the income eect prevails, the pension function is increasing and convex in K.
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that Peq(!;K) is concave both in the labor income and in capital income tax
rates (if saving decrease with K), with maxima, respectively, at ~ ! and ~ K. However, when the income
eect prevails, saving increases with the tax rate: it follows that the pension function is convex, with a
maximum at K = 1 (see Figure 6). In the following, to make the analysis non-trivial32, we will restrict
our attention to the interval ! 2 [0; ~ !].
31In the following we denote with l
y(!i) and l
ma(!i) the optimal labor supplies for, respectively, young and middle aged,
and with s
y(j;!i) and s
ma(j;!i) their optimal saving decisions, for income levels i = R;P and the individuals' degree
of time inconsistency j = TI;TC.
32If the tax rate is above ~ !; it is obvious that every individual prefers to tax more capital, since it increases the transfer
Peq:














































































6.2 Second step: To Vote or Not to Vote?
To account for the positive correlation between productivity level and political participation (voting
turnout, campaign contributions. lobbying etc.)33, we assume that it exists an exogenous costs C associ-
ated with voting activity (watching debates on TV, comparing dierent political platforms and candidates
etc.). If these costs are high enough, an individual chooses not to vote 34.
The cost C is such that only a fraction z of poor votes 35, while all rich vote; the budget constraints








ma(1   !) + si;j
y (1 + r(1   K)   C
ci;j
o = (1 + r(1   K))(si;j
y + si;j
ma) + P   C
Notice that, being C xed, the comparative statics performed in the previous sections remains valid. Our
assumption of lower turnout among poor create a discrepancy between the number of voters and the
number of individuals alive. The number of voters in every group x, denoted by vx; is given by:
33Our model does not want to explain the determinants of this correlation, but only its implications for a probabilistic
voting model.
34We realize that this is a very simplifying assumption: a more realistic and complicated model should take into account
that the voting decision results from as a trade-o between two opposite forces: from one hand, voting is costly and poor
may decide not to vote; on the other hand, there are psychological factors, not related to any economic variable, that
positively aect the probability of voting: for instance, some individuals perceive voting activity as a \duty", and thus they
to do it anyway, whatever the cost is. The psychological motive could be modeled as an i.i.d. random variable R, with
c.d.f. F(:) and density f(:). In this modied framework, very poor individuals with high psychological motivation may still
decide to vote in equilibrium. We believe, however, that all main insights of our simplied model will hold also in such
enlarged framework since for poor individuals the rst force is still relevant, whereas for rich individuals the cost C remains
negligible.
35Empirical evidence shows that there is a correlation between age and political participation: senior citizens more
involved in the political process: however, for the moment, we neglect this additional stylized fact
24vP;TI
y = zPTIny Poor hyperbolic Y vP;TC
y = zPTCny Poor exponential Y
vR;TI
y = RTIny Rich hyperbolic Y vR;TC
y = RTCny Rich exponential Y
vP;TI
ma = zPTInma Poor hyperbolic MA vP;TC
ma = zPTCnma Poor exponential MA
vR;TI
ma = RTInma Rich hyperbolic MA vR;TC
ma = RTCnma Rich exponential MA
vP;TI
o = zPTIno Poor hyperbolic O vP;TC
o = zPTCno Poor exponential O
vR;TI
o = RTIno Rich hyperbolic O vR;TC
o = RTCno Rich exponential O
The parameter z is chosen such that the number of rich individuals do not represent the majority of
the electorate (the vote share of rich middle aged plus rich young plus rich old is lower than 1/2 of the
total population), so that the policy proposed in equilibrium must also receive the approval of the poor
classes, in every generation.
7 The Party's Choices: Solving the Model
Each party maximizes the expected total number of votes from the three generations currently alive,
taking into account all the subgroups that exist within each generation, and the dierent turnouts level









o (qm) are dened by (13), (14) and (15).
The equilibrium concept adopted is similar to Profeta (2004): the two parties decide the policy vector
having in mind the utility of current generations . Young and middle aged expect, in a stationary















8.1 Labor Income Tax Rates
Preferred tax rates for the dierent groups in our economy have the following properties.
Proposition 4 Preferred labor tax rates have the following properties:




! (!P;j) > ma
! (!R;j);
(ii) Every old individual set o
!(!i;j) = ~ !, 8i;j;
25(iii) For a given income level, hyperbolic consumers prefer lower labor income taxes than time consistent
ones: y
!(!i;TC = 1) > y
!(!i;TI) and ma
! (!i;TC = 1) > ma
! (!i;TI);
(iv) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for young individual: y
!(!R;TC = 1) >
y
!(!R;TI) > y
!(!P;TC = 1) > y
!(!P;TI);
(v) If there is enough inequality in the economy, we have that, for middle aged individual: ma
! (!R;TC =
1) > ma
! (!R;TI) > ma
! (!P;TC = 1) > ma
! (!P;TI).
Proof. In appendix.
Proposition 4 sheds light on the voting behavior of the dierent groups: in (i), we show the intuitive
result that preferred ! are decreasing with !i: poor, looking for more intergenerational redistribution,
prefer to increase the tax as to augment the transfer P.
In (ii), we show that all old (rich, poor, time consistent and time inconsistent) set the same ! = ~ !,
namely the tax rate that maximize the value of the transfer. This is intuitive, since all the economic
decisions have been already taken, they maximize consumption levels by maximizing P.
In (iii), we analyse the second source of heterogeneity, keeping !i constant. We show that hyperbolic
individuals set lower tax rates than exponential: the intuition is that the former group faces a dierent
trade-o for labor taxation than the latter: for hyperbolic, increasing ! has a current cost (it reduces
labor supply and consumption), and a benet that is postponed in the future (it increases the transfer
P at t = 3) as it is discounted by the lower factor 2. On the other hand, exponential, who fully
understand the intertemporal trade-o at stake, set the \correct" tax rate.
Finally, in (iv) and (v), we aggregate for the two sources of heterogeneity and we rank preferred labor
tax rates as follows:
o
!(!i;j) = ~ ! > ma
! (!P;TC) > ma




! (!R;TC) > ma
! (!R;TI) > y
!(!R;TC) > y
!(!R;TI)
8.2 Capital Income Tax Rates
Depending on whether higher K increases (resp. decreases) savings, i.e the income (resp. substituion
eect) prevails, two dierent cases are possible.
8.2.1 Case (a): Increasing K reduces Saving
If the income eect is lower than the substitution eect, the pension function is increasing and concave
in K (see gure 6). Proposition 5 follows immediately.
Proposition 5 (Substituion Eect Dominates) Preferred tax rates, denoted 
g
K(j;!i), for g =
y;ma;o; i = R;P and j = TI;TC, satisfy the following properties:
26(i) 
g
K(j;!i) are decreasing with income, 8g, for a given j;
(ii) 
g
K(j;!i) are decreasing with the parameter of time inconsistency j, 8g, and for a given i;
















Part (i) shows that preferred capital taxes are decreasing with income. This result has two reasons:
rst, poor save less, and a higher tax on capital reduces less consumption levels and utiltity. Second,
poor benet more from redistribution by increasing K and P.
Part (ii), keeping constant !, analyzes how time inconsistency aects preferred capital tax rates. We
show that, within all generations, !(!i;TC) < !(!i;TI). Two eects determine this result.
First, there is a direct eect: hyperbolic are less hurt by a reduction of the after tax return of saving,
since they save less than far-sighted. Second, there is an indirect eect: Propositions 1(v) and 2(v)
show that the decrease in saving due to a higher K is lower for time inconsistent agents. Therefore,
the decrease in current and future utility is lower for this group. Third, there is an hyperbolic eect:
capital taxes lead to an intertemporal trade-o not present in labor taxation. Taxing more capital income
increases current consumption (which is benecial, from the perspective of a present biased individual) at
a delayed costs (less consumption tomorrow, due to reduced saving and lower after tax capital income).
All eects goes in the same direction: it follows that hyperbolic would like to set higher capital taxes
than exponential, in order to keep constant Peq.36
Part (iii) shows that, for a given j and !i, old prefer higher taxes than young and middle aged.
Like for labor taxes, old do not make any economic decision: they set taxes as to maximize consumption
levels. Notice that the preferred tax is lower than ~ K, the tax that maximizes Peq.
Finally, in (iv) we aggregate for the two sources of heterogeneity and we rank preferred labor tax
rates:





>  K(!P;) >  K(!P;1) >  K(!R;) >  K(!R;1)
where  K(!i;j) is the common preferred tax rate for young and middle aged with the same i and j.
36In Proposition 5 we have assumed that middle aged time inconsistent save less than exponential, i.e. the exponential
eect dominates the catching up eect. If this is not the case, and hyperbolic saves more the two eects described before
goes in opposite directions. A priori, we do not know whether the chain of inequalities (20) changes or not. If yes, we have
that: ma
K (!P;1) > ma
K (!P;) > ma
K (!R;1) > ma
K (!R;).
278.2.2 Case (b): Increasing K increases Saving
If the income eect dominates the substitution eect, the pension function is increasing and convex in
K (see gure 6). The following proposition summarize the properties of preferred tax rates.
Proposition 6 (Income Eect prevails) Preferred tax rates, denoted ^ 
g
K(j;!i), for g = y;ma;o;
i = R;P and j = TI;TC, satisfy the following properties:
(i) 
g
K(j;!i) are increasing with income, 8g, for a given j;
(ii) 
g
K(j;!i) are decreasing with the degree of time inconsistency j, 8g, and for a given !i;

















Results do not change substantially from Case (a): this is not surprising, as the eects (positive or
negative) of a change in K are soften for hyperbolic individuals (as accumulated savings are lower) and
delayed in time.
However, a dierent result is given by (i): now, rich individuals prefer higher taxes than poor indi-
vidual: for them, consumption in the future is relatively cheaper, and a higher tax increases it through
saving. Finally, in part (v), we claim that preferred capital tax rates are always higher if the income
eect prevails than when the substitution eect prevails.
8.3 Political Equilibria
Given the structure of voters' preferred tax rates, it is immediate to see why time inconsistent individuals
prefer to have a policy vector in which capital taxes are relatively higher than labor income ones. To
simplify, in the following we are going to concentrate on Case (a), i.e saving decrease in response to an
increase in K. The following lemma shows that time inconsistent individuals are more single minded
that time consistent ones.
Lemma 1 Hyperbolic individuals are more ideologically homogeneous (single minded) than time consis-
tent ones.
When voting over the composition of the tax burden that nances a redistributive transfer P, indi-
viduals take into account not only the factors (labor and capital) they own, but also the timing of the
tax. Single mindedness comes form the fact that time inconsistent agents prefer a higher K compared
28to a far sighted with the same income level. Two eects determines this result: rst, hyperbolic own less
capital than exponential. Second, the eectsof a higher tax are postponed in the future (if young) and
soften by the suboptimality of his choice (if middle aged).
Lemma 1 allows us to fully describe the set of equilibria of the model.




vector qeq is characterized as follows:
(i) if z = 1 and TI = 0, qeq is such that:
y
!(!R) < ma
! (!R) < y
!(!P) < ma
! (!P) < eq
! < ~ ! (20)
 K(!R) < 
eq
K <  K(!P) < o
K(!P) < o
K(!R) < ~ K
(ii) if z < 1 and TI = 0, qeq is such that:
y
!(!R) < ma
! (!R) < eq
! < y
!(!P) < ma
! (!P) < ~ ! (21)

eq
K <  K(!R) <  K(!P) < o
K(!P) < o
K(!R) < ~ K




! (!R;) < ma





! (!P;) < ma
! (!P;1) < ~ !







K(!P;) < ~ K




! (!R;) < ma





! (!P;) < ma
! (!P;1) < ~ !
 K(!R;1) <  K(!R;) < 
eq





K(!P;) < ~ K
29In equilibrium, both parties propose the same platform, as problem (17) is the same. Policy vectors




In part (i), we show that, if all poor vote, z = 1, and time inconsistency is not an issue (TI = 0),
Tabellini-Persson (2003) holds: representing the majority of the electorate, and holding less capital, poor
prefer to tax more capital than labor: both parties will then propose a policy vector that includes poor
preferred tax rates.
In part (ii), we show that, if TI = 0, and with turnout positively correlated to income level, the
upper class, who saves more, becomes more attractive for the two parties which are willing to reduce
both taxes, and the transfer P, as rich individuals are not interested in redistribution, and prefer to keep
the transfer as lowest ast possible.
Part (iii) considers the case of full turnout and time inconsistency: the policy platform is distorted
toward capital taxation, and the equilibrium capital tax is higher than incase (i): in this case, also
time inconsistent individuals prefer to tax more capital than labor income, given that their saving are
suboptmal, and they are more mobile than exponential rich.
Finally, in part (iv), we assume that z < 1 and TI > 0. To win the elections, parties have to please
the swing voters: Lemma 1 shows that hyperbolic care more about labor income taxation and are more
\single minded" and more likely to sway their vote if the tax burden is more distorted toward capital
taxation. Therefore, proposing hyperbolic's preferred K and !, both parties receive the support of
hyperbolic rich and the fraction of politically active poor.
9 An Illustration
Without loss of generality, let us suppose that it exists only one generation, and that parameters are
such that sP;TI < sP;TC = sR;TI < sTC;R. There are n + 1 individuals in our economy; the n agents are
equally split into the four groups (i.e. each group has size 1=4) and there is also a \lonely" poor37, who
can be either hyperbolic or exponential. Following Propositions 4 and 5, we have that preferred capital








K . With exponential preferences and full turnout,




K. The probabilisting voting equilibrium
is such that P
K would be proposed in the equilibrium platform q by both parties.
Suppose now that no poor, except for the lonely one, show up at the election day: the implemented K
will be R
K, and this is the paradoxical result we do not observe in reality. However, with hyperbolic agents
(and limited turnout), an opportunistic party maximizes the number of votes obtainde by proposing the
K preferred by sR:TI
ma , as to gain 1
2 + 1 of the eective electorate.
37The additional individual breaks the eventual ties; moreover, assuming that poor represent the majority of the popo-
lation is a reasonable assumption.
3010 Conclusions
This paper sheds light on the political determination of the tax burden (capital taxation and labor
taxation) that nances a redistributive transfer: in particular, we justify why we observe positive level
of capital taxes, in spite of the popular view and most normative economic theories.
Two ingredients characterize our political model: rst, we take into account that political participation
is an increasing function of income (Lijpart, 1994) and therefore positive levels of capital taxation can
not be justied simply by invoking the political power of the lower class. Second, by introducing time
inconsistency in individuals' preferences, we show that also the upper class may be in favor of tax burden
distorted toward capital taxation. The intuition for our result is fairly intuitive: time inconsistent
individuals are more politically homogeneous (\single-minded") and, for any income level, prefer to tax
more capital, instead of labor income, since accumulated savings are below the planned (and optimal)
level. An opportunistic political party that maximizes the probability of winning the elections, therefore,
nds protable to propose a policy vector that entails a positive, and possibly high, level of capital
taxation: the group of hyperbolic individuals has more \swing voters", and it is more united in his
political action.
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35A Appendix
A.1 Closed Form expressions for Saving
In Section 6 we provided the generic form for the equilibrium saving functions. If we assume that u(c)
and v(l) have the CES specication, (si;j
y ) and (si;j



















































































































The sign of some derivatives will be crucial in the following proofs. First, let us introduce some notation:








R = 1 + K + K2 > 0


























































We are interested in determining how K;R and M vary with the capital income tax rate, K, and the
short-term discount factor, j:
36@M





















> 0; since  2 (0;1)
@R
@K = @K



















@j (1 + 2K) < 0
For future references, we compute also how dierences in j inuence the marginal variation of saving
























A.3 Proof of Proposition 1













































































M + (!i(1   !))













If II > I, (resp. I > II), saving decrease (resp. increase) with K. Only a further specication of the
parameters of our model (but with a substantial loss of generality) will determine which eect prevails.






















37The whole derivative has the same sign as the term in square brackets: if the income eect outweighs the

















































@ to be positive is that both a and b are increasing
with j, given that we already show (see section A.2) that @R
@j < 0. Dierentiation of the two terms
yields to:
@a










 (2 + K)












































































@j@K . A sucient condition for the whole derivative to be positive, is that both derivatives are




















(1 + K)3 
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38We already show that the denominator of (A26), R, is decreasing with K: @2R
@j@K
< 0.








 (1 + K) > 0. It follows that:
@2a
@j@K

























































A.4 Proof of Corollary 1










: To show the Pareto-improvement, we use




the utility of a young individual of type j, given his saving decision,
si;j
y . We want to show that:













depends on  in two ways: from one hand,  is the degree at which future utility
















does not depend on : In the proof, we characterize the value of f(:) in










: In order to evaluate the
































































= 0. It is
possible to show that f"(1) > 0: Given that f(1) = 0; f0(1) = 0 and f"(1) > 0; there exists an interval
  ;1

such that f() > 0 for  2
  ;1

: This shows that a sophisticated individual is made better o
by saving up to si;TC
y . Pareto dominance follows from the fact that an individual is made better o in
two ways: rst, they prefer to save si;TC
y that increases consumption when middle age and, second, they
would gain a higher transfer P when old, for a giving K, as implied by si;TC
y .
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2


















































In part (iii), we compute the marginal variation of saving in response to an increase of the capital















































@K II + @II
@K I + @III
@K IV + @IV
@K III

. Giving that I, II, III,
IV > 0, and computing all the derivatives, it emerges that two opposite eects determine the sign of the
derivative:
Substitution eect < 0
 








































































As for Proposition 1, a priori, we do not know which eect prevails.












The relative magnitude of the two terms determines the sign of the derivative: if the substitution eect





















= a   bc (A29)
40where:











































We already show that
@(a)
@j > 0 and
@(b)
@j > 0 (see part (iv) of Proposition 1). Moreover, dierentiating



























Exponential Eect (> 0)






























The derivative has the same sign as the term in square brackets, which coincides with term a of (v)). We
already know that @a
@j > 0.



















@j@K . Second, by applying the same decomposition of
















A sucient but not necessary condition for the derivative to be positive is that the rst term on the RHS
















K7 + 8K6 + 9K5   2K4   10K3   6K2   2K   1

< 0 , K > 1







41A.6 Proof of Corollary 2














as the utility of a middle





. We want to show that:













depends on  in two ways: from one hand,  is the degree at which future utility
















does not depend on : In the proof, we characterize the value of f(:) in










: In order to evaluate the









































































such that f() > 0 for  2
  ;1

: This shows that a hyperbolic individual is
made better o by saving up to si;TC
ma . Pareto dominance follows from the fact that an individual is made
better o in two ways: rst, they prefer to save si;TC
ma that increases consumption when middle age and,
second, they would gain a higher transfer P when old, for a giving K, as implied by si;TC
ma . If, on the
















is the optimal level of saving.
A.7 The Transfer P
The equilibrium transfer P, nanced through the proceeds of the two income taxes, depends on individ-

































for time inconsistent and far-sighted individuals. Replacing into (A32) the expression for labor supply





























































A.8 Proof of Proposition 3



























































 M) 2 +   1




R + K + (M) 2

> 0
are constant terms that do not depend on !.
Expression (A33), has not a clear sign; however, it is possible to show that it exists a threshold level
~ ! such that
@Peq(!;K)
@! > 0 for 0  !  ~ ! and
@Peq(!;K)
@! < 0 otherwise. In this interval, moreover,


















The sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the term in square brackets: if the substitution eect
is greater than the income eect, both @STI
@K and @STC
@K are positive: the equilibrium transfer is linear
and increasing in K (Figure 6a). If the income eect prevails, then Peq(!;K) is concave in K: it
exist a threshold value for the tax rate, ~ K, suche that the transfer increases up to ~ K, and decreses

















, i.e. the variation of individuals' saving in response to a variation of K is
bigger for time consistent agents.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4


























































































In part (i) of the Proposition we show that, for a giving degree of time inconsistency, labor income
tax rates are increasing with income. To see that, let us consider, without loss of generality, a middle













Assuming that the SOC are satised, @!=@!i has the same sign of @2V i;j
ma=@!@!i. Taking into account
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K))!il






































We already show that
@
2Peq(!;K)
@!@!i < 0 and






has to be positive
in order to have an interior solution for (A37).




!(j;!i) = ~ !, 8i;j, i.e. old maximize their consumption level by setting the tax rate that maximizes
the pension function39>













39Also ! = 1 implies
@Peq(!;K)










Parts (iv) and (v) follow immediately.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 5











































































































In part (i), we claim that tax rates are decreasing with !. For old, simply notice that from Proposition
3 we know that 8i, sP;j
ma < sR;j




the concavity of the pension function implies that:
~ K > o
K(j;!P) > o
K(j;!R)
Comparing (A39) and (A40), it is immediate to see that the problem is very similar for middle aged
and young: without loss of generality, we are going to consider only middle aged agents. The implicit













Assuming that the SOC are satised, @!=@!i has the same sign of @2V i;j
ma=@!@!i. If saving are positive































































In (ii) we show that preferred K are decreasing with j. For old agents, notice that Proposition 3
assures that 8i, si;TI
ma < si;TC




of P ensures: o
K(TI;!i) > o
K(TC;!i), for i = P;R. If there is enough inequality in the economy,far-
sighted agents save less than hyperbolic rich: sR;TI
ma < sP;TC
ma . It follows that preferred tax rates can be
ranked as follows:













































In (iii) we show that, for a given productivity level and j, preferred K for old are greater than those
for young and middle aged. Comparing (A38) and (A40) we notice that FOC for middle aged has an
additional negative term compared to the FOC for old. It follows that o(j;!i) > ma
K (j;!i). Finally,
since FOCs (A39) and (A40) are the same, we have that: ma
K (j;!i) = 
y
K(j;!i)40.
Part (iv) follows immediately from previous discussions.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Preferred tax rates satises equations (A38), (A39) and (A40). Given that P is linear in K, old, for
any type, prefer the maximum tax rate, K = 1. The proof of rest of the Proposition follows exactly the
proof of Proposition 5.




@j > 0. If this is not the case, the sign of (A42) is undetermined.
46A.12 Proof of Proposition 7
First, let us consider the equilibrium labor tax, eq






























Depending on the values of the key parameters of our model, z and TI, several cases are possible.
Case 1: z = 1 and TI = 0
y
!(!R) < ma
! (!R) < y
!(!P) < ma
! (!P) < eq
! < ~ !
Poor and old receive more weight in the party's objective function; since ! increases with income, their
most preferred tax rate will be the equilibrium one.
Case 2: z < 1 and TI = 0
y
!(!R) < ma
! (!R) < eq
! < y
!(!P) < ma
! (!P) < ~ !
If only a fraction z of poor votes, they receive less weight in the objective function: the platform is
distorted towards rich's preferred labor tax, which is lower.




! (!R;) < ma





! (!P;) < ma
! (!P;1) < ~ !
With full turnout and time inconsistency, the equilibrium ! is lower than case 1 but higher than case 2.




! (!R;) < ma





! (!P;) < ma
! (!P;1) < ~ !
If only a fraction z of poor votes, they receive less weight in the objective function: however, now the
platform is distorted towards hyperbolic rich's preferred labor tax, which is lower.
47Let us consider now the equilibrium capital tax, denoted 
eq
K . Equation (18) can be rewritten as





























Depending on the values of z and TI, several cases are possible:
Case 1: z = 1 and TI = 0
 K(!R) < 
eq
K <  K(!P) < o
K(!P) < o
K(!R) < ~ K
Poor and old are more attractive for both parties: since P > R, the equilibrium tax is the one preferred
by them. Given that K increases with income, their most preferred tax rate will be the equilibrium one.
Case 2: z < 1 and TI = 0

eq
K <  K(!R) <  K(!P) < o
K(!P) < o
K(!R) < ~ K
Poor are not decisive anymore, since zP < R: the equilibrium tax rate is the lowest possible.
Case 3: z = 1 and TI > 0







K(!P;) < ~ K
With full turnout, and time inconsistency, equilibrium capital taxes are higher than case 1: poor form a
coalition with time inconsistent individuals, who are politically more homogeneous.
Case 4: z < 1 and TI > 0
 K(!R;1) <  K(!R;) < 
eq





K(!P;) < ~ K
With less than full turnout and time inconsistency, equilibrium capital taxes are lower than case 3
but higher than case 1: the fraction of politically active poor forms a coalition with time inconsistent
individuals as to increase equilibrium capital taxes.
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